Why does there seem to be so much pointless, unnecessary, and gratuitous evil? Here are two answers:
1) That evil really is pointless, unnecessary, and gratuitous.
2) All of that evil (all of it, down to the last starving child) is necessary for the realization of God's Wonderful Plan which, over the course of eternity, will redeem all that evil.
It seems to me to be an acceptable epistemological rule is "If, by our best lights, it seems that X, then we can reasonably believe that X even though possibly not-X." Our best science tells us that the earth is about 4.6 billion years old. We certainly can accept this even though it is possible that the universe was created five minutes ago with everything looking old and our apparent memories being illusory. So, if theists want to make any headway with promoting #2, they need to show that it is not just possible but probable. However, the utter unknowability of God's putative plan makes such an argument impossible. What possible good could redeem the most horrendous evils? Either it would be a good of the sort we know or some kind of good of which we have no knowledge. Yet, no amount of any good that we know of could redeem the worst evils. If, on the other hand, it is some putative unknown good, then, since it is unknown, it cannot be adduced as even a possible compensation for evil, much less a probable one.
Why does there seem to be so much pointless, unnecessary, and gratuitous evil? Here are two answers:
1) That evil really is pointless, unnecessary, and gratuitous.
2) All of that evil (all of it, down to the last starving child) is necessary for the realization of God's Wonderful Plan which, over the course of eternity, will redeem all that evil.
It seems to me to be an acceptable epistemological rule is "If, by our best lights, it seems that X, then we can reasonably believe that X even though possibly not-X." Our best science tells us that the earth is about 4.6 billion years old. We certainly can accept this even though it is possible that the universe was created five minutes ago with everything looking old and our apparent memories being illusory. So, if theists want to make any headway with promoting #2, they need to show that it is not just possible but probable. However, the utter unknowability of God's putative plan makes such an argument impossible. What possible good could redeem the most horrendous evils? Either it would be a good of the sort we know or some kind of good of which we have no knowledge. Yet, no amount of any good that we know of could redeem the worst evils. If, on the other hand, it is some putative unknown good, then, since it is unknown, it cannot be adduced as even a possible compensation for evil, much less a probable one.
All makes sense and thanks for saving Susie. But doesn't their answer come in the - god coming to earth to show his love story?
Only if they concede that their god is as arbitrary and capricious as I was--saving a spider one time but wantonly stepping on her the next.